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ABSTRACT: In this reading of the Euthyphro, Socrates and Euthyphro 
are seen less in a primordial conflict between reason and devotion, 
than as sincere Hellenic polytheists engaged in an inquiry based upon 
a common intuition that, in addition to the irreducible agency of the 
Gods, there is also some irreducible intelligible content to holiness. 
This reading is supported by the fact that Euthyphro does not claim 
the authority of revelation for his decision to prosecute his father, but 
rather submits it to elenchus, and that Euthyphro does not embrace 
the ‘solution’ of theological voluntarism when Socrates explicitly 
offers it. Since the goal of this inquiry is neither to eliminate the 
noetic content of the holy, nor to eliminate the Gods’ agency, the 
purpose of the elenchus becomes the effort to articulate the results of 
this productive tension between the Gods and the intelligible on the 
several planes of Being implied by each conception of the holy which 
is successively taken up and dialectically overturned to yield the 
conception appropriate to the next higher plane, a style of 
interpretation characteristic of the ancient Neoplatonists.
The Euthyphro comes at the very beginning of the traditional 
arrangement of Plato’s dialogues—traditional at least as far back as 
Thrasyllus—and, at least for us, tends to set the stage for the 
unfolding of Plato’s thought, though the relative dearth of attention 
paid to it in antiquity stands in contrast to the importance assigned to 
it today. This fact should, indeed, alert us to the possibility that typical
modern approaches to the dialogue are motivated by typically modern
concerns. It is most well-known for the so-called ‘Euthyphro dilemma’ 
it has imparted to the philosophy of religion. This problem is concisely
stated in the dialogue at 10a: “Is the holy [hosios, also frequently 
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translated ‘pious’], holy because it is loved by the Gods, or loved [by 
them] because it is holy?” Without wishing to discount the 
significance of the abundant reflections upon this problem in 
philosophy after antiquity, or to deny that we can see ancient 
Platonists on many occasions wrestling with the ‘Euthyphro problem’, 
albeit not explicitly linked to this dialogue, it would not be unfair, I 
think, to say that thinkers after antiquity have approached the 
problem within the framing of monotheism. Some scholars, to be sure,
particularly recently, have displayed greater openness than others to 
situating the [21] piety of Socrates and of Plato within Hellenic 
polytheism, rather than on a trajectory away from it and toward some 
variety of philosophical monotheism; Mark McPherran and Jon 
Mikalson, in particular, stand out in this regard. To be open to this 
requires acknowledging, among other things, that the absence, in a 
given dialogue or even generally, of explicit affirmations, much less 
elenctic justifications, of elements utterly basic to the worldview of a 
Hellenic polytheist cannot be taken as manifesting a lack of support 
for them. It seems too often as though Socrates is on trial again in the
pages of modern scholars who demand from him and from Plato an 
arbitrarily high threshold of proof that they identify with the tradition 
of Hellenic polytheism, or define that tradition so narrowly as to 
ensure that they do not.1 While in many respects it is quite difficult to 
1 Examples of this tendency in the literature abound. For example, 
Kofi Ackah declares the “dialectical result” of the dialogue up to 11a 
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say something novel about Plato, in this respect, that is, insofar as one
would speak about Plato the polytheist, it still is not.2 This essay is not
about polytheism as a mere socio-historical fact in the Euthyphro; 
rather, it concerns the meaning and value of the Euthyphro for the 
polytheistic philosophy of religion. Therefore, I do not intend to 
concern myself a great deal with the abundant secondary literature on
the dialogue, but rather with reading the text, thinking along with it 
to be that “piety understood as a relationship between humans and 
externally existing, fully anthropomorphic gods has no probative basis
and is logically incoherent,” (“Plato’s Euthyphro and Socratic Piety,” 
Scholia 15 (2006), p. 30), when demanding proof for the existence of 
the Gods is far from being the goal of this Platonic dialogue; nor is it 
clear how such positive ontological results are supposed to be 
produced from the dialectical procedure. Similarly, Roslyn Weiss 
argues “that it does not follow from Socrates’ engaging in sacrificial 
rites either that he believes in the gods to whom he sacrifices or that 
he regards such activity as pious,” and even dismisses his final words 
at Phaedo 118a as a “genuine expression of piety,” (“Virtue Without 
Knowledge: Socrates’ Conception of Holiness in Plato’s Euthyphro,” 
Ancient Philosophy 14 (1994), p. 272 n. 23.). Weiss takes no account 
of the testimonies elsewhere in Plato, or in Xenophon, to Socrates’ 
belief in the Hellenic Gods, despite the fact that her thesis concerning
the non-epistemic character of Socratic piety would be entirely 
consistent with sincere participation in the Hellenic theophany. 
McPherran, at least, does not deem to accuse Socrates of having 
forsworn his several civic oaths, “all of which called the gods of the 
state as witnesses” (“Does Piety Pay? Socrates and Plato on Prayer 
and Sacrifice,” p. 95).
2 ‘Still’ in the sense that there are definite indications of positive 
movement toward at least the openness I described; Gerd Van Riel’s 
Plato’s Gods (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013) being a prominent example. 
My reference to Plato here, rather than to Socrates and Plato, 
represents an initial acknowledgement that I see Plato’s depiction of 
Socrates in the so-called ‘early’ dialogues as part of a theoretical 
continuum with Plato’s ‘late’ metaphysics, and not as a categorically 
different undertaking.
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and around it, but informed particularly by hermeneutic strategies 
characteristic of the Neoplatonists. [22]
At stake in the Euthyphro, clearly, is the relationship between 
theology and philosophy. Euthyphro is a diviner, Socrates a 
philosopher: one of the things we must measure for ourselves is just 
how great this difference is, and what is its true nature. This 
difference can be exaggerated. As McPherran points out,3 Socrates’ 
interactions with his daimonion do share certain traits with divination,
and Socrates does upon occasion speak of himself as a sort of lay 
mantis (e.g., Phaedo 85b; Phaedrus 242c). Euthyphro, for his part, is 
akin to Socrates in more than just the ways he cites himself at the 
beginning of the dialogue, and of which modern readers are too 
derisive. It should not be, after all, an affront for Euthyphro to express
such a kinship.4 Moreover, since the later antique Platonic tradition 
regarded the etymologies à la Euthyphro in the Cratylus (396d & sqq.)
not as mocking, but as sincere, the notion that Socrates and 
Euthyphro have each something to learn from the other is not 
3 “Socratic Reason and Socratic Revelation,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 29.3, July 1991, pp. 345-373.
4 One interesting commonality between them not cited by Euthyphro 
himself is a strong concern with purification. While commentators 
have often remarked upon Euthyphro’s concern with miasma as 
exceptional, typically in support of arguments that Euthyphro’s 
religious orientation lies outside the mainstream of Athenian religious 
life, somewhere on the ‘Orphic’ spectrum (e.g. Kahn, “Was Euthyphro 
the Author of the Derveni Papyrus”, pp. 56-7), they have not tended to
relate this to Socrates’ own conception of elenchus as “a kind of ritual
purification of the soul,” (McPherran, Religion of Socrates, p. 152), 
and to the (much debated) ‘Orphic’ aspects of Plato’s own thought.
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outlandish. In this sense, we may see Euthyphro and Socrates as 
engaged in the same work, broadly conceived: namely, out of a 
personally experienced sense of divine vocation, trying to grasp for 
themselves, and not merely through passive participation in the social
dimension of cult, something about the nature of the Gods and about 
the nature of the cosmos as the Gods would know it. Hence Proclus5 
sees Socrates in the Cratylus as mediating between Euthyphro’s 
‘imaginative’ (phantastikos) and passively given (boskêmatôdeis, 
literally as of what is fed to domesticated animals) conceptions about 
the Gods, and his own characteristically ‘scientific’ (epistêmonikos) 
understanding, by assuming a ‘doxastic’ mode in the Cratylus 
etymologies, one, that is, in which there is at once that which is the 
object of belief or doxa, such as the proper names of Gods who are the
objects of experience and religious regard, and also intellectual 
insight, as we see in the interpretation Socrates develops from 
examining the names of the Gods as modified words or strings of 
words. In this doxastic labor Socrates recovers from the names given 
to the Gods in the theophanic experience of the ancients that moment 
of cognitive and intelligible response to theophany that embodies, 
inseparably, the presence of the Gods and of the human agent 
together in the encounter. [23]
5 In Platonis Cratylum Commentaria, ed. Pasquali, pp. 67.24-68.9.
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The contrast between Socrates and Euthyphro against a shared 
background of common effort is echoed in something Socrates says at 
3d, namely that Euthyphro is not in danger of prosecution from the 
people because he does not impart his wisdom (sophia) to others, or 
rather, we might say, that as a diviner Euthyphro shares only the 
results of his inquiry. Socrates is ironic, or perhaps merely polite, in 
attributing to Euthyphro a wisdom withheld, when the wisdom in 
question can only be attributed, first, to the Gods themselves, and 
second, to the one who can arrive at an adequate interpretation of 
what is conveyed to the diviner, and through them to a wider public. 
Even if Euthyphro possessed the wisdom to interpret the results of his
divination, this would bear an ambiguous relationship his job 
description, so to speak, as a diviner.6 
It must be said, in this connection, that Euthyphro never claims 
in the dialogue to have been specifically directed by the Gods to do 
anything. Can we, then, simply assume that Euthyphro is acting as a 
result of some kind of divination? I do not see how we can. It is, 
rather, Euthyphro’s father who is explicitly said to have sought out a 
6 See Aaron Landry, “Inspiration and Τέχνη: divination in Plato’s Ion,” 
Plato Journal 14 (2014), pp. 85-97 for a nuanced treatment of the 
issue of the diviner’s knowledge. Even Theoclymenus, Socrates’ 
example of possession divination, from Odyssey 20.351-7, is able to 
interpret his divination (20.367-70) (pp. 90-1); and Diotima, from the 
Symposium, is at once diviner and philosopher (pp. 92-3). See also 
chap. 3, “Divination and its Range of Influence,” in Jon D. Mikalson, 
Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), pp. 110-139.
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religious adviser (exêgêtês, 4c). Even if we accept that Euthyphro 
would regard himself as an exegete adequate for his own purposes, 
Euthyphro simply does not ever frame his decision in a manner that 
presents it as the result of any kind of divination. All that we can see 
from what is on the page is that Euthyphro has inferred his 
responsibilities through analogy with myths. Plato therefore does not 
stage in this text a direct confrontation between reason and 
revelation. It would have been awkward, no doubt, for Euthyphro to 
say that he had been directed to this course of action by a God, and 
for Socrates to proceed to interrogate that revelation, especially 
since, as McPherran points out,7 Socrates speaks in his own case of 
receiving divine direction from divination and from dreams, as well as 
from his divine sign or daimonion. However, as McPherran goes on to 
argue, Socrates does nevertheless have a way open to him to criticize 
any given interpretation Euthyphro offers of the revelation he has 
received without resorting to impiety, and we ought not assume that 
Plato felt incapable of presenting such an inquiry in a suitable fashion.
Indeed, the manner in which the discussion proceeds would seem to 
suggest that Euthyphro is not to be understood as acting on a specific 
divine direction, but rather on a general conception of what counts as 
pious behavior, [24] a conception which is in broad terms within the 
boundaries of what generally counts as piety among his peers, though 
7 “Socratic Reason and Socratic Revelation,” p. 351.
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his application of these norms has led to a result that will surprise 
those peers.8 This makes the move to an inquiry into the nature of 
piety a natural one—in fact, a move that Euthyphro has already 
implicitly made himself. In this respect, we may class Euthyphro 
among those clergy of whom we read in the Meno that Socrates has 
had conversation, inasmuch as they wish to give a reasoning account 
of their ministry (Meno 81a). Or at least, that Euthyphro has a 
tendency in this direction, inasmuch as he seems to have a certain 
inchoate sense that reasoning should play some role in his religious 
life, even beyond the necessity for interpreting his direct 
communications from the Gods, so that his piety can inform even 
those decisions he makes without recourse to divination. In this 
respect, it may be significant that it is within the time it takes for his 
father’s messenger to seek out the advice of the exegete that his hired
man dies, though the death is directly caused by his father’s 
negligence (4d). Nor are we told the result of the consultation with 
the exegete. It seems that Plato feels no need to even provide the 
materials for a confrontation between reason and revelation as such.
8 Jon D. Mikalson, Honor Thy Gods: Popular Religion in Greek Tragedy
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 198-
201 argues persuasively that “Euthyphro’s concept of piety” as 
displayed in the dialogue, “echoes similar thoughts found throughout 
Greek tragedy,” and that “scattered and fragmentary parallels for 
Euthyphro’s ideas appear in other sources for popular religion,” hence
“his conception of piety was not idiosyncratic,” (201). 
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Most notably in this respect, when given the opportunity by 
Socrates to render his stated beliefs mutually consistent by 
straightforwardly affirming that holiness just is an effect of divine will,
Euthyphro does not do so, clearly wishing to preserve the noetic 
integrity of the notion of holiness (10a-c). What troubles Euthyphro, or
at least perhaps does so once Socrates has pointed it out, is that he 
has no rational means for adjudicating between two conflicting pious 
duties: reverence for the law, and reverence for his father, whom he 
would prosecute under the law. Euthyphro’s intention is to prosecute 
his father as the law would demand, and he sees this as following 
from a universal, implicitly rational maxim that the law should apply 
to everyone equally (4b). We know from Gorgias 480c that Socrates 
does in fact agree that one should try to see ones friends and family 
prosecuted if they have done wrong. But how has Euthyphro gotten to
this recognition? He doesn’t seek to justify this maxim, or his intended
actions, through reason, or at any rate, only through a particular kind 
of reasoning, namely arguing that for him to prosecute his father in 
this fashion honors a principle established by the Gods when, for 
example, Zeus overthrows Kronos. We should not be too quick to 
dismiss this line of thought. Analogy is a form of reasoning, and the 
transition from the reign of Kronos to [25] that of Zeus as recounted 
in Hesiod does lead to the establishment of a more just order among 
the Gods, one chiefly operating through persuasion and the balancing 
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of honors (timai) rather than force of will (Ouranos) or calculation 
(Kronos). 
Euthyphro’s application of analogy implies that a principle can 
be univocally applied to Gods and to humans, despite their different 
ontological status: “they are inconsistent in what they say about the 
Gods and about me” (6a). This again suggests that Euthyphro is really
seeking, whether he recognizes it or not, an exercise of reason that 
would transcend the division between humans and the Gods. Nor does
Euthyphro see a symbolic interpretation of the myth, even though he 
emphasizes to Socrates the supra-rational nature of the events treated
in myths. For when Socrates expresses doubt that there could really 
be war between Gods, Euthyphro characterizes such truths as 
‘marvelous’ and ‘astonishing’ (6b, c), but does not draw the further 
conclusion that just insofar as these mythic events are mysterious that
they might not therefore provide simple, unproblematic analogies to 
human behavior. Daniel Werner’s recent study, “Myth and the 
Structure of Plato’s Euthyphro,”9 though highlighting the importance 
for the dialogue of Euthyphro’s “adherence to traditional myth,” fails 
to even recognize the possibility of a pious and symbolic hermeneutic 
of myth beyond the simplistic opposition of mythos and logos. The 
issue cannot be reduced, as Werner would wish, to a matter of an 
“acceptance” or “rejection” of traditional myths, or of whether 
9 International Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 52, No. 1, Issue 205 
(March 2012), pp. 41-62.
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“acceptance” of the myths is “loose” or “wholesale” (p. 46). Mythic 
reception is hardly so simple. We should not assume that Plato would 
be averse to a symbolic hermeneutic of myth. In the critique of mythic
poetry in the Republic, myths requiring esoteric (or ‘hyponoetic’, Rep.
378d) interpretation are not suitable for unmediated, simplistic 
application, which is why it is questionable to impart such myths to 
children, who are not capable of advanced theology, or to inhabitants 
of a ‘fevered’ city whose state of total mobilization, a permanent state 
of emergency, may render them similarly impaired. Such symbolic 
interpretation has as its guiding principle, not the reduction of 
‘irrational’ myth to some purified logos, but the pious regard for the 
Gods as being “each the most beautiful and best thing possible” (Rep. 
381c).
Insofar as problematic myths like these shed light in particular 
upon the ontological difference between humans and Gods, however, 
it may well be these myths that interest us most of all. To guide us in 
their interpretation, however, we shall need philosophical, ontological 
tools. Once these were developed within Platonic schools, the 
interpretation of such myths flourished, not in a defensive posture, 
but rather for the genuine ontological value such myths have to 
offer.10 But in the Euthyphro, the difference between humans and 
Gods is [26] approached obliquely, through a series of hypotheses 
10 See, e.g., Lamberton, Homer the Theologian; Struck, Birth of the 
Symbol.
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about the nature of holiness all of which have a domain of valid 
application, but all of which also contain some seed of their dialectical
reversal, which will urge us further along in a manner that, in fact, 
sketches for us the outlines of the structure of being. This, at any rate,
is the style of positive interpretation of dialogical refutation favored in
the later Platonic schools, and which serves us better than other 
interpretive hypotheses with respect to this dialogue, if we do not 
assume that Plato intends to portray Socrates as overturning, rather 
than merely refining, popular conceptions of piety.11
The essential question in the Euthyphro, and in the Platonic 
approach to theology generally, I would argue, is the relationship 
between the singular (the unique or ‘peculiar’) and the common. 
When Euthyphro chooses to treat the events of myth just like worldly 
events, and looks to define holiness according to what the Gods 
choose, he chooses in favor of the singularity of the Gods as 
individuals, rather than orienting himself to divine attributes. He 
affirms the integrity of the Gods by affirming the unique, unrepeatable
nature of the mythic event, which can offer a paradigm for practice 
precisely insofar as it does not depend upon some further principle 
which it merely instantiates, and which would therefore demand a 
11 See Mikalson (2010) for an extended defense of the mainstream 
nature of at least some version of all of the models of piety proposed 
in the Euthyphro.
12
prior elucidation. At the same time, he searches for a universality 
which would not compromise singularity. 
From the perspective of later Platonic philosophy of religion, 
Euthyphro indeed shows the proper instincts at least, in that he 
wishes both to secure the ontological priority of henadic individuals 
(the unique Gods) to the eidetic or formal in its entirety and to pursue 
an eidos of the holy—for Euthyphro does not accept the proffered 
voluntarism in which the holy would be holy purely by virtue of the 
Gods’ having chosen it. We do not have to assume that, as R. E. Allen 
would have it, Euthyphro is simply a theological voluntarist who 
misunderstands his own position.12 Rather, we can see Euthyphro as 
experiencing a legitimate pull in both directions, and that preserving 
and articulating this tension, rather than collapsing it into one pole or 
the other, is the Platonist’s legitimate aim as well. This tension can be 
seen as driving the Euthyphro’s dialectic.
Euthyphro realizes in an inchoate fashion that affirming divine 
individuality—and, inherently, plurality—ought not lead to a skeptical 
or nominalistic rejection of the eidetic altogether. ‘Holiness’ ought to 
have something [27] common to it, though he is correct to reject that 
such a common substance—or a common substance for any of the 
virtues—will subordinate the Gods existentially, and Plato does not 
12 Plato’s Euthyphro and the Earlier Theory of Forms: A 
Reinterpretation of the Republic (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 1970 
[repr. 2013]), p. 44.
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press such a conclusion, either. The Good, rather, as we will see from 
the Republic, is beyond substance (ousia), which in the later 
development of Platonism was elucidated, in conjunction with the 
henology of Plato’s Parmenides, as expressing the primacy of the 
unitary or singular (heniaios), of individual existence (hyparxis), over 
the ideal or formal.13 Hence the ‘Euthyphro problem’ is really that of 
how the common emerges from the singular. The singulars ‘down 
here’, so to speak, everyday units, may indeed be ontologically 
posterior in many ways to the forms they participate, but the ultimate 
singulars, the Gods, eternally generate their community. Moreover, 
even if we had no Gods, we would have to be able to at least conceive 
such autonomously good agents in order to secure the metaphysical 
possibility of freedom. It solves nothing to either reduce these agents 
to arbitrary, and hence unfree choices, or to a good which arbitrarily 
chooses them.
We see a reflection of this problem of peculiarity in the 
discussion of conflicts among the Gods (7b-d). Insofar as the conflicts 
between the Gods are understood to be peculiar to each, they lack, by 
definition, objective resolutions. In this way they are like disputes 
over the Good among us, which in our case produce enmity (7d). This 
is not to say that enmity results in the divine case, and Socrates would
certainly reject that it does. But when the conflicts among the Gods 
13 Cf. “Polytheism and Individuality in the Henadic Manifold,” 
Dionysius Vol. 23, 2005, pp. 83-104.
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are understood as strife among absolutely unique individuals, all of 
whose attributes are also taken as wholly unique to each of them, 
there can necessarily be no formalization of the conflict as embodying 
a conflict of objective principles that might therefore be mediated. 
Dispute on this plane, the plane of pure singulars, is always a dispute 
over each separate act (8e), and any resolution will also be unique. 
Hence for us as well, when we take ourselves existentially, that is, as 
singulars, each problem of the application of principles is occurring as
it were for the first time, every time. If Euthyphro is going to stay on 
the plane of singulars—which is in one respect a low plane of being, 
when it pertains to singulars such as us, but in another respect the 
highest, when it pertains to a priori singulars such as Gods—then only
a singular judgment, such as an act of divination, can justify his act.
Euthyphro does not resort to this, however, inasmuch as he 
continues to accept Socrates’ challenge to him to produce 
universality, something that can be affirmed as true of all the Gods, 
without restriction, and hence something true of them qua Gods. This 
is the breakthrough in which we are invited to participate: an inquiry 
into the Gods as a kind of thing, with an essential nature, a nature of 
Godhood. At the beginning of the Platonic enterprise, therefore, we 
are advised [28] that the inquiry will extend even this far. But where 
we mistake the enterprise is in seeing its end as placing a reified 
essence prior to the existence of the Gods, or, for that matter, 
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affirming a wholesale subordination of other individuals to the Idea. 
Moreover, what prevents the latter is precisely that very Platonic piety
which will not subordinate the Gods in this fashion. Hence other 
singulars are saved, too, in varying degrees, and with a status 
doubtless ‘problematic’, by that philosophical piety which saves the 
Gods. Saving the singulars is the problem, and this is what 
recognizing Platonic piety, not toward the Idea, but toward the 
immortals, and toward the possibility of fellowship with them in and 
through our mortal being, allows us in turn to understand about the 
entire Platonic project.14 
The dialectical ascent, then, begins in earnest from 10a-c, where
Socrates poses to Euthyphro the question of whether he wishes to 
regard holiness as simply a passive quality of things resulting from 
their having been chosen by the Gods. That it should be merely an 
implicitly arbitrary choice and a resulting pathos of something, rather 
than a relationship more fundamental and even in some way 
constitutive for both, is the bottom, baseline position, but one which 
also, if we read it proleptically, reflects, just by virtue of being the 
lowest, something of the pure causal activity of the highest principle, 
for the Gods as the ultimate agents will indeed, in the ultimate 
development of antique Platonism, possess this sheer sovereignty over
14 I have developed this at further length through a reading of the 
Phaedrus and Symposium in “Plato’s Gods and the Way of Ideas,” 
Diotima: Review of Philosophical Research 39, 2011 (Hellenic Society 
for Philosophical Studies, Athens), pp. 73-87.
16
Being in the last analysis. Conceiving of the holy in this fashion would 
also be consistent with the Platonic doctrine regarding powers, and 
therefore would conceive that which is holy as the receptacle of divine
power. Thus in the Republic (477c-d), we read that powers (dynameis)
can be discriminated in no other way than by that to which they are 
relative and by that which comes about through them.15 A power, thus,
has no intrinsic character but what it is in that which it effects, and 
thus this putative definition of holiness may be regarded as the 
‘power’ definition. Powers are therefore, in themselves, pure 
relations, and holiness the pure power of relation to the Gods, without
any further intelligible determination, as transcending the intelligible.
The proper understanding of the ontological status of the powers of 
the Gods lies on the far side of the investigation Socrates and 
Euthyphro are now undertaking, however, not to mention on the far 
side of the historical development of Platonism in antiquity. Therefore,
Euthyphro correctly refuses to stay at this position as it is 
prereflectively articulated, and not ripe to be grasped, even though it 
would be [29] consistent with the intuition of the sovereign power of 
divine choice. He wishes, instead, to pursue the choiceworthiness of 
that which the Gods choose. 
15 Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s discussion of this doctrine in “The 
Dialectic of the Good in the Philebus,” pp. 117-118 in The Idea of the 
Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. P. Christopher Smith 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
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In addition to the desire for a substantial notion of the holy, 
however, Socrates points out a problem forcing the ascent, by posing 
the question of fear and reverence at 12a-b. We have reverence for 
something in regard to a virtue it possesses, while we fear something 
simply because of its action or possible action upon us; and yet insofar
as reverence is a part (meros) of fear (12c), we see again the 
emergence of something with eidetic content from out of something 
conceived as a pure relation. Socrates thus presents Euthyphro with 
another implicit figuration of divine production.
The structural consideration with respect to fear and reverence 
leads Socrates in turn to the notion of holiness as a part of justice, as 
reverence is a kind of fear. Now it is a question, not of something 
structurally homologous to the relation between the Gods and the 
(eidetically) holy, but of something that might begin to speak to the 
nature of holiness itself. The question of piety as a part of justice 
concerns the place that piety, the activities specifically directed 
toward the Gods in devotion (therapeia), has in the system of the 
cosmos, of the total well-ordering of things. It takes up again the 
purely interactional or relational conception of the holy as that which 
is chosen by or beloved of the Gods. This conception is enriched, 
however, through recognizing that holiness thus conceived is an 
attribute, not of the holy thing in isolation, but of an economy of 
devotion. It represents an advance in this respect. But given its wide-
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reaching significance, how can this economy be just one part of the 
whole of justice, just one activity among the many activities of 
necessity and of choice that fill up a life?
This question concerns the status of the Gods as a particular 
class among beings, a portion of the cosmos. Eventually Platonists will
come to recognize [30] that the Gods cannot just be certain things 
among all other things. Hence, at the beginning of this journey, 
Socrates asks the aim of attending to the Gods. It cannot have as its 
aim supplying some need, and hence making the Gods better in some 
way (13c-d). This would be the case if the Gods were solely part of the
cosmic system, immanent in it without remainder. There is something 
limited and misleading, therefore, about the economic model, at least 
if we understand it as a crude exchange. To every stage of the 
dialectic corresponds some belief or practice which the dialectical 
progression does not demand be abandoned, but for which rather it 
poses a problem, and solving this problem will save what is true in it. 
The priestesses and priests mentioned in the Meno, like Diotima in 
the Symposium, were not looking for something to supersede their 
devotional works, but for a way of articulating the relationship of 
these acts to the world. 
If Socrates is holding the Gods’ transcendence—at least 
partially or in some respect—of the cosmic economy in his pocket, so 
to speak, this is not at any rate an insight available to Euthyphro. The 
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next step in the dialectic, accordingly, comes with Euthyphro’s 
substitution of a sublimated economy for the crude one based on 
need: service (hypêretikê) to the Gods in pursuit of their work (ergon) 
(13d-e). The importance of the relationship of service to the Gods is 
emphasized by its reemergence at a crucial moment in the 
Parmenides (134d-e), where the mastery-and-service relationship 
between the Gods and ourselves, insofar as it parallels the 
relationship between the forms and our knowledge of them, poses 
what is termed the ‘greatest difficulty’ with respect to the theory of 
forms, if it be poorly understood, for it implies that “we do not rule the
Gods with our authority, nor do we know anything of the divine with 
our knowledge, and by the same reasoning, the Gods likewise, being 
Gods, are not our masters and have no knowledge of human affairs,” 
(134e, trans. Fowler, mod.).
In the Platonic consideration of the economy of mastery and 
service, we glimpse the economy of recognition that Hegel would 
articulate so many centuries later. The difficulty of this relationship, 
embodied in Euthyphro’s inability to say what is the work of the Gods 
in which we serve them, lies in the fact that there are relationships 
the very idea of which makes necessary reference to that which lies 
outside the realm of the ideal. It is not simply that we lack the 
knowledge we would need to assist the Gods properly in their work, 
but rather of conceiving, in the first place, a work as common to them 
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and to us. Knowledge in itself is the grasp of the formal by something 
not solely formal, namely the soul; so too, the mastery exercised by 
the Gods over us involves essentially entities which in a certain 
respect would not exist for them. Hence, we do not see ourselves in 
the myths. We may analogize ourselves to figures in the myths, as 
Euthyphro does when he analogizes himself to Zeus and his father to 
Kronos, or, more humbly, as when we see ourselves in the mortals 
portrayed in myth, but we are not straightforwardly there, in that 
world. Those mortals, too, can only be the object of analogy. In this 
way, there is something [31] in the devotional economy that 
transcends the economy of myth, which like the economy of the ideas 
or forms is fundamentally intellective. Here we see how a simplistic 
opposition of mythos and logos cannot do justice to the labors of Plato
and Platonists. Myths have two faces, one of which looks back to the 
singularity of the Gods and of revelation, the other of which looks 
forward to hermeneutic exegesis and the ideas which emerge from it. 
The limitation of analogy lies in its potential obstruction of the 
recognition of the procession of being, with its necessary moment of 
disanalogy. Devotion must incorporate the alterity that makes it 
possible for Gods and mortals to recognize one another in the full 
alterity of their divergent existential conditions.
From the holy as simple object of divine intention, Socrates and 
Euthyphro passed on to the notion of a devotional economy of 
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holiness, which has now been refined implicitly from the gross 
economy of exchange to the sublimated economy of recognition. This 
economy of recognition transcends even the plane by which the Gods 
give form to the cosmos, namely the plane of mythic relationships and
reciprocal action within the divine sphere. The economy of devotion, 
properly understood, therefore, transcends the economy of demiurgy. 
This would have to be the case for polytheism not to collapse into 
intellectualized cosmotheism, and for piety as a distinct activity to 
disappear. This is the recognition entailed in the reformulation 
McPherran offers of the conception of divine service in response to 
Socrates’ forceful hint at 14c that Euthyphro has come very near the 
solution to the nature of holiness before turning aside.16 For 
McPherran, the positive Socratic conception of piety is accordingly 
“that part of justice that is a service of humans to gods, assisting the 
gods in their primary task to produce their most beautiful product.” 
But we can see that something has dropped out of consideration in 
order to formulate this definitive statement, which is both action-
based and focused purely on human action. This is a serviceable 
definition of piety as a human virtue or activity, but not, it would 
seem, of holiness as embodying, or at least including, the 
choiceworthiness of the objects of divine choice. This latter, rather, 
has been pushed back out of view, implicit in the notion of the Gods’ 
16 “Piety, Justice, and the Unity of Virtue,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 38.3 (July 2000), pp. 302-3.
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‘task’. For what makes something a task of the Gods? Is it simply that 
They have taken it up, or is it the task’s intrinsic value?
Accordingly, when the difference between humans and Gods is 
elided, at least aspirationally, in Plato’s Republic, the discrete virtue 
of piety vanishes altogether into that of justice, which is simply the 
proper adjustment of powers in the soul, in society, and in the cosmos 
to one another.17 There is a sense in which everything, simply by 
fulfilling its nature and playing out its role in the [32] cosmic system, 
is holy or is expressing piety, but does the attempt to define piety truly
dissolve it? Or perhaps the worship of the Gods is something really 
distinct in itself, but is nevertheless undertaken purely for the sake of 
the cosmos? This is the position suggested by the notion that piety is 
“the science [epistêmê] of sacrifice and prayer” (14c), the object of 
which is to “bring salvation to individual families and to states” (14b). 
The way in which this position is described, both in its recourse to a 
notion of science, and in its salvific application not to the individual as
such, but to greater social units, suggest that it is the highest point 
achieved by the intellectualized conception of piety, insofar as the 
latter will only with difficulty recognize the particular, by a process of 
determining ‘down’ to it by increasingly finer sortal ‘nets’. Salvation, 
at any rate, as the product of devotion, is indicated by Socrates to be 
very close (14c) to the solution of the problem of what holiness or 
17 Cf. McPherran, “Piety, Justice, and the Unity of Virtue,” pp. 324-5, 
326-7.
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piety is with respect to its intelligible content, unless the nearness he 
indicates, but does not specify, is instead the notion of service in a 
noble work. Or can it be both, in the sense that the state of our souls 
in our disposition toward the Gods, that is, the pure relation among 
Gods and mortals, is itself the work, to which of necessity we are 
peculiarly qualified? 
A relationship of justice toward the Gods is paradoxical to the 
degree that they do not need anything from us, and cannot be 
bettered by our attentions to them (15a-b), even if a beautiful work 
could be achieved by them and ourselves in concert. They must 
therefore in themselves remain in some respect outside the economy 
of reciprocal benefit that they underwrite. Even justice most widely 
and sensitively conceived will thus fall short in capturing what piety 
is, though it can go a very long way. The very best account we can 
give of religious life in terms of reciprocal exchange (do ut des), even 
refined to the ultimate degree, still lets something escape. The Gods, 
to exist in the way the Hellenic tradition intuitively grasps them—
because we must recognize that Socrates at no time in this dialogue, 
or elsewhere, really, introduces novel, controversial premises 
concerning the Gods, but at most sets the consequences of one 
intuition against another—must not exist solely in the economy of 
piety, and therefore the inquiry into the nature of piety has run its 
course, with the Gods Themselves as its remainder and its 
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precondition. But piety’s epistemological virtue is just that this 
immanent inquiry should reveal the objects of its peculiar concern in 
this light: the Gods would be of all things what concretely instantiates 
such self-sufficiency.
The course of this dialectic has therefore proceeded along two 
tracks, one explicit, in which an intelligible content has been sought 
for holiness or piety, the progress of which has at every stage also 
revealed a corresponding, implicit conception of piety, in which the 
holy is so inseparable from divine activity itself as to escape any 
intelligible framing we might design for it. The circle to which 
Socrates refers, then, at 15b-c, is not a vicious one, unless we are [33]
convinced that it is a failure to have elucidated the series of meanings 
attributable to piety, their sufficiencies and insufficiencies, and also to
recognize in the end that there is something more than intelligible 
embedded in the concept. In this respect, Socrates’ reference to his 
ancestor Daidalos suggests not merely that the argument has gotten 
away from Euthyphro, but the magic of ensoulment showing itself and
arising through the effort at understanding. It is true that in a certain 
respect, when Socrates urges Euthyphro to “begin again at the 
beginning” with him (15c), the putative positive conception of piety 
discerned by McPherran at 14b has been undermined. The notion of 
service to the Gods in support of a work of theirs has only a relative 
stability; to return again to the beginning is to return to the motor 
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that has driven the dialectic all along, namely the creative tension 
between the impulse to compromise none of the Gods’ agency, and the
understanding that the Gods, being Gods, must have a will that is 
good, too, and hence this goodness is there to be found in the choices 
they make.
Euthyphro is often treated with rather more scorn by modern 
commentators than Socrates’ other interlocutors, despite the fact that
none of them hold up particularly well to Socrates’ scrutiny. Some of 
this, I believe, is attributable to a bias against Euthyphro’s religiosity, 
which is bound to please neither the atheist nor the monotheist. 
Euthyphro, in any case, as I have remarked, deserves credit for one 
thing, at least: he never seeks to jettison the notion of some 
intelligible content for the concept of the holy. He tries, instead, to 
hold together the search for this intelligibility and his intuition that 
there is something irreducible in the relationship to the living Gods. In
this, Euthyphro shows himself a true Hellene, we may say, in refusing 
to divorce the Gods from the world and from reason, nor divorce 
these from the Gods. Whatever transcendence is accorded the Gods, it
will not be of the sort that Kierkegaard demands for his God, namely 
the suspension of all rational and moral claims in the face of the 
divine command. 
For failing to adopt this Kierkegaardian solution, or the 
alternative of an intellectualized piety refined virtually to the point of 
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atheism, Euthyphro is branded a shallow thinker who cannot see 
clearly enough to embrace either ‘genuine’ theology or rationality. But
in refusing this dichotomy, Euthyphro remains true to the fundamental
theological intuitions of his culture, and I would argue that Socrates 
and Plato would not wish him to do otherwise. Euthyphro may not be 
a gifted dialectician, but his project is theirs as well, a project in 
which the transcendence of the Gods in Hellenic theology will ground 
the cosmos and our free exercise of reason, not suspend it. It’s not 
insignificant, in this light, that Euthyphro seeks divine sanction for 
recourse to the Athenian justice system, and his transgressiveness lies
solely in that he would allow the law to be applied within his family, 
rather than shielding them. 
Socrates, however, has by the end of the dialogue shown it to be
thoroughly [34] problematic to attempt to justify social action by 
recourse to theology. But this is because Euthyphro has tried to do so, 
as it were, without the Gods themselves. Euthyphro tries to match 
mythic incidents to worldly problems as simple precedents, a portion 
of myth to a part of the world, but this part-to-part correspondence 
will undermine the whole-to-whole relationship of the Gods to the 
social and the cosmic order, the same whole-to-whole relationship that
any living thing has to the cosmos, for the Gods are for Euthyphro and
Socrates alike living immortals, and not abstract principles or mere 
formulae that can be applied indifferently, in their personal absence. 
27
But this does not leave only divination, on the one hand, and a godless
reason on the other, a dichotomy alien, I believe, to the mainstream of
Hellenic thinkers.18 Socrates’ own piety, on the testimony of Plato and 
of Xenophon alike, argues rather for an integration of reason and 
revelation in a unified soteriology.  
18 Even Werner, in an account otherwise hostile to Hellenic theology, 
recognizes that Euthyphro’s rejection of the voluntarism Socrates 
offers him is at least in part due to the fact that “Nowhere in the 
traditional myths are the gods represented as the sort of beings who 
definitively establish the nature of right and wrong (or pious and 
impious) simply through a decree or fiat,” (p. 50).
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